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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING THE LAW OF
CHARITABLE DONATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS
By GEORGE G. BOGERT*
In the past few years a number of changes or proposed alterations in
the law of charities have been adopted or advanced.
Solicitation of Gifts for Charity.
A subject which has received great attention in the press is the solicita-
tion of gifts to charitable causes and the use of funds thus collected. It has
been alleged that large sums have been received by solicitors for projects of
public interest, that in some cases the promoters were unscrupulous and em-
bezzled the contributions or paid exorbitant salaries or expenses, that often
only a small part of the proceeds of the campaigns ever reached the intended
beneficiaries, and that no representative of the public had adequate knowl-
edge of the disposition of these donations.
The Attorney General in California has made an investigation of this
subject and the State Senate Interim Judiciary Committee has taken testimony
and made a report with recommendations.' The Municipal Code of Los An-
geles' requires promoters of such campaigns to secure licenses from the City
Board of Social Service Commissioners and gives that board powers of
regulation and prohibits the promoters from committing certain described
acts which would involve fraud on the public. It appeared in evidence that
in 1951 approximately 1,556 individuals or organizations sought to solicit
funds in Los Angeles and that some $36,000,000 was collected.
The State Welfare and Charitable Contributions Code' requires a solici-
tor of charitable gifts to file with the Department of Social Welfare a copy
of an audit of its books annually, but excepts religious, educational or hos-
pital organizations, community chests, the Red Cross and the Salvation Army.
This law also requires persons or organizations intending to solicit to file
with the Department a detailed statement as to the contributions to be sought
and the use to be made thereof.
The Senate Committee recommended4 that, since many of the drives
were interstate in character, Congress be memorialized to investigate the
subject and that the California Committee cooperate with any such federal
inquiry; and it urged that the California statute be amended so that penalties
should be provided for failure to file reports with the Department of Welfare
and that powers of enforcement should be given to that agency.
*Professor of Law, University of Califorma, Hastings College of Law. A.B. 1906, LL.B. 1908,
Cornell University. Professor Emeritus, University of Chicago Law School
"Second Progress Report by Senate Interim CQmmitte, Senator Burt W. Busch, Chairman, 1953.
'Ord. No. 77,000.
'Secs. 147-147.4.
"Supra note 1 at 50.
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During the latter part of 1953 a New York Senate Committee held hear-
ings on this same problem under the chairmanship of Senator Tompkins and
received startling testimony as to imposition upon the contributing public and
the waste of charitable donations. It appears that legislation to exclude un-
scrupulous solicitors and to give state supervision and control over funds
collected is likely to be adopted in New York soon.'
Inspired by these and similar disclosures it would seem likely that
efforts will soon be made in many states to increase safeguards for donors
and the public with reference to such solicitors and the funds they receive.
State Supervision and Enforcement of Charities.
The law considers the public the beneficiary of charitable trusts and
imposes a duty on the Attorney General of the State to act for the State in
keeping track of the existence of charities and in seeing that they are prop-
erly guarded and administered. Originally in England, and until recently in
the United States, this duty was stated by common, statute or constitutional
law briefly and in general terms, with no specification of the methods to be
employed and no provision for furnishing the Attorney General with the facts
regarding the charities in his jurisdiction. The state legal departments have
had no systematic plans for listing charities and their records have been
fragmentary and haphazard. Nor has there been generally any organized
effort to supervise and enforce trusts which were known. Sporadically and
casually there have been investigations and suits. The work of the Attorney
General in this field has been considered one of his minor functions and has
not received much attention unless public spirited citizens have complained
about the administration of a particular charity. Consequently, it is gen-
erally agreed6 that a substantial portion of charitable trusts have become
neglected or abused and no action has been taken to apply a remedy.
The authorities in England have recognized this problem and long ago
attempted to solve it by statutory provisions for investigations and the making
of inventories of charities7, and in more recent times have set up an agency
of a quasi-judicial or administrative nature, namely, the Board of Charity
Commissioners which has been collecting statistics about charities and their
status since 1853.8 Under this Charitable Trusts Act great progress has been
'N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1953. It is reported in the N.Y. Times of Feb. [7, 1954, that bills have
been introduced in the New York Legislature requiring registration and bonding of solicitors of
funds for charity (except religious, educational, fraternal and social organizations), giving the At-
torney General powers of supervision, and requiring non-resident charitable organizations which
solicit in the state to designate the Secretary of State as an agent for the receipt of process. These
bills have now become law.
'TAYLOR, PUBLIc ACCOUNTABILITY OF FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS (1953).
'For an historical resume of the steps from 1601 to 1853 see pp. 18-21, REPORT OF THE COMt-
MITTEE ON CHARITABLE TRUSTS (the Nathan Committee), presented to Parliament in Dec., 1952.
'The Charitable Trusts Act, 1853, 16 and 17 Viet., c. 137.
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made toward the establishment of a complete register of charities, the collec-
tion of annual reports of their work, and the enforcement of such trusts by
the Board through advice to trustees, administrative orders, and cy pres
applications.' In 1950, the Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, appointed a Parlia-
mentary Committee, headed by Lord Nathan, to study the situation regarding
charities and to recommend improvements. This committee reported in 195210
and urged the continuance and strengthening of the Charity Commissioners
system, with its register and accounts. Parliament has not yet acted on this
report.
In the United States a movement along lines similar to the English sys-
tem began in 1943 in New Hampshire" with the creation of a special depart-
ment in the Attorney General's office for charitable trust supervision, and for
investigations, the preparation of a register, annual reports by trustees, and
duties on the part of public officials like court clerks to aid the Attorney Gen-
eral. This scheme has been followed, with some slight changes, in Rhode
Island in 195012 and Ohio in 1953,"s and was proposed but rejected in
Massachusetts in 1945' and in Texas in 1953."5
Although in California there has been some statutory recognition of the
power and duty of the Attorney General to collect information regarding
charities and to enforce them,"0 the state law department feels that better
results could be obtained if a statute like the New Hampshire Act were en-
acted. Hence the Attorney General's office has drafted a statute to that end
which will probably be introduced soon. Attorney General Brown's office
has found many cases of idle or dormant funds and believes that research
would bring others to light.' Investigations of the handling of the proceeds
of "charity days" at the race tracks showed instances where they had been
diverted to private benefit and gave rise to much comment in the newspapers.
The legislative investigation in New York, previously mentioned, may
well lead to the statutory establishment of a special division of charitable
'REPORT OF THE CHARITY COMMISSIONERS FOR 1953; NATHAN REPORT, p. 25.
"
0Report available at H.M. Stationery Office, London, price 6s. 6d.
"
1N.H. Laws 1943, c. 181, as amended in 1945, 1947 and 1949.
"R.I. Acts 1950, c. 2617, as amended in 1951.
"'Omo REv. CODE (1953) §§ 109.23-109.33, 109.99. Similar legislation was also adopted in
South Carolina in 1953. S.C. Acts 1953, No. 274. Trustees for charity are required to file with the
Attorney General copies of their trust instruments and annual reports. The Act is not to apply to
trusts or trustees of churches, cemeteries, orphanages operated in conjunction with churches, hos-
pitals, colleges, universities, school districts, or to banking institutions which are under the super-
vision of state or federal agencies.
1130 Alss. L.Q. 22, 51 (1945).15H.B. 538.
"CALIF. CORP. CODE § 9505 (non-profit corporation holding property in trust for charity sub-
ject to examination by Attorney General who shall bring proceedings to enforce trust) ; § 10207
(corporations for eleemosynary or charitable purposes subject to examination by Attorney General
who shall bring needed proceedings to enforce compliance).
"REPORT DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1950-1952 at 14.
1954]
trust enforcement, with elaboration of duties similar to those laid down in the
New Hampshire Act.
Due to the request of the National Association of Attorneys General the
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has been working since
1952 on the preparation of a model or uniform act covering this topic of the
law."8 It appears likely that such a proposed statute may be completed in
1954.
All in all it seems that there is a probability that developments along the
lines of the English and New Hampshire Acts will continue in the United
States in the next few years.
The Widening of the Cy Pres Doctrine.
A major feature of the English Nathan Report of 1952"s was a plea for
the enlargement of the cy pres power so that it should cover not only cases
where the charity as originally established was "impossible" or "impractic-
able" of fulfillment, but also instances where the charity was, or had become,
wasteful or inexpedient, so that it could reasonably be argued that it would
be much better social policy to apply the fund to a purpose of greater value
to the public. A possible example might be found in a case where a donor
had a hundred years ago established a trust to print and distribute books
on a topic of popular interest, but which, due to recent discoveries and a
change in the tastes and habits of the people, now receives very slight atten-
tion. In such a case it is not physically impossible or impracticable to con-
tinue offering the books to the public and an occasional reader may get some
benefit from them, but the educational advantage to the state will be very slight
as compared to the benefits which might be received from encouraging some
other similar objective.
The idea suggested has had some support in Scotland2" and was dis-
cussed at length in a debate in the House of Lords21 on the Nathan Report,
but no action has been taken on the proposal, and since the Report was a
creature of the Labour Government the fate of all its recommendations seems
to depend upon a return of that party to power.
There has been no corresponding change proposed in the United States
and it seems probable that none will be offered. It is believed that the Ameri-
can Courts have not confined cy pres to cases of strict "impossibility" or
absolute "impracticability," but rather have applied the doctrine to clear
"
8
HANDBOOK, NAT. CONF. COMBS. UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1952), p. 512; and 1953 Handbook
(not yet published). A revised draft of the proposed Uniform Act has very recently been prepared
by Rupert R. Bullivant of Portland, Oregon, Chairman of the Committee. Another draft has been
separately prepared by Professor Allison Dunham of the University of Chicago Law School and his
assistant, Mr. Gordon P. Ralph.
"
9 NATHAN REPORT, p. 70.
2 NATHAN REPORT, p. 78.
"Parliamentary Debate Reports, July 22, 1953.
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cases of wastefulness, inexpediency, and other situations where it has been
physically possible but socially highly undesirable to continue the charity
as the donor framed it. Thus, in California in the case 2 of a gift to construct
a monument on Telegraph Hill in San Francisco in honor of the pioneers,
where the Coit Tower had already been constructed on that hill, and it ap-
peared that another monument could not be erected there "without obstruct-
ing the roadway leading to the summit and without detracting from the beauty
of the landscaping," the fund was applied cy pres to collect written ma-
terial regarding the pioneers and to construct monuments and plaques to
celebrate the events of their time. Here there was not impossibility or im-
practicality in a technical sense, but rather a high degree of inexpediency.
This tendency in the case of American courts to construe "impracticality"
as including wastefulness, or to add "inexpediency" as a separate cause for
the use of cy pres, probably makes unnecessary the statutory expansion of
the cy pres doctrine proposed in the Nathan Report.
A change in cy pres law accomplished by a recent revision of the Penn-
sylvania statutes2 3 is worthy of extension to other states, but no tendency to
copy it has been noticed. This amendment accomplished the abolition of the
distinction between "general" and "particular" charitable intent in the ap-
plication of cy pres. The orthodox doctrine at common law is that only where
the settler showed an intent to benefit charity as a whole or one type of charity
in general could cy pres be employed. If his purpose was construed to be to
help a single charity only, and this purpose failed of accomplishment, the
court would not frame a scheme to substitute some related or similar charity.
The objection to this doctrine is that the line between general and narrow
intent is extremely difficult to draw, that the donor rarely expresses himself
clearly on the subject, and that the court is in reality speculating whether
his purpose was broad or particular. It would seem better to require a settler
who had a local or limited purpose to state this fact expressly and to provide
that cy pres should not be applied but rather that the property should go else-
where in case of failure of the charity. This would remove a cause of occa-
sional wasteful litigation and make the pathway of the charitable trustee an
easier one to follow.
The Salvaging of Mixed Charitable and Non-charitable Trusts.
The Nathan Report of 1952 made a recommendation intended to save
for charity the property of certain trusts which are vulnerable to attack. 4
These are the gifts where the trustees are at liberty to spend the funds for
22Society of California Pioneers v. McElroy, 63 Cal.App.2d 332, 146 P.2d 962 (1944).
"
8Pa. Estates Act, § 10 (1947).
'Supra note 7 at 120. It appears that a bill has been introduced in Parliament validating to
a certain extent as charitable mixed trusts which took effect prior to Dec. 16, 1952, the date of the
publication of the Nathan Report. 97 SoL. J. 888 (Dec. 26, 1953). The bill is called the Charitable
Trusts (Validation) Bill.
19541
objects admittedly charitable but also are permitted to make expenditures for
certain secondary purposes which are not technically charitable. The best
example is found in the case where the trust is for "charitable or benevolent"
objects and the court holds that benevolent is wider than charitable and in-
cludes purposes which have no social benefit. Here, if the donor has not pro-
vided a method of splitting the property between the two types of objects,
the usual holding has been that the entire trust was void because of the
indefiniteness of the non-charitable objects and also usually because the
trust was a mixed trust to last for an indefinite period and so was said to
involve a "perpetuity."
In England it was not until about 1949 that the situation with regard to
this problem had become clear, as the result of decisions. 5 The Nathan Com-
mittee believed that large numbers of these trusts having a primary charitable
and a secondary or incidental non-charitable purpose had been created prior
to 1949 in ignorance of the law applicable. It felt that it would be greatly to
the public advantage, and not unfair to the next of kin of the donors, to adopt
a statute validating as exclusively charitable (with some qualifications) all
mixed trusts created before December 31, 1950, a date at which the 1949
decisions should have been known and appreciated, but leaving subject to
attack mixed trusts created after December 31, 1950. This would not only
insure the application of much valuable property to public uses, instead of
turning it over to relatives of the donor who were never intended by him to
get it, but would also remove from the trustees of these trusts liability for
expending the funds for charity in good faith over a period of many years.
There seems little likelihood that this suggestion will appeal to Ameri-
can legislators. The courts in this country have been liberal toward mixed
trusts and have made great efforts to validate them for charity, either by
finding means of dividing the capital between the charitable and non-charit-
able purposes,26 or by treating as immaterial a minor and temporary non-
charitable purpose, 7 or by construing words like "benevolent" as synonyms
for charity.2" But where the trust could not be saved in some such way the
American courts have felt obliged to strike it down at the suit of the heirs
or next of kin, and it seems very doubtful whether the courts or the legisla-
tures would be sympathetic toward salvaging for charity an indivisible trust
which, due to the ignorance or blundering of the draftsman, had been given
purposes which were clearly mixed objects. The law to this effect seems to
have been settled here for many years. No startling new decisions have been
"Ellis v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, [19491 31 Tax Cases 178; Oxford Group v. Com-
missioners of Inland Revenue, [19491 2 All E. R. 537; In re Diplock, [1944] A.C. 341.
"Coffin v. Attorney General, 231 Mass. 579, 121 N.E. 397 (1919) ; In re Palethorp's Estate, 249
Pa. 389, 94 Atl. 1060 (1915).
'Graham v. Bergin, 18 Ohio App. 35 (1923) ; Wright's Estate, 284 Pa. 334, 131 Atl. 188 (1925).
"Estate of Hinckley, 58 Cal. 457 (1881) ; Smith v. U. S. Nat. Bk. of Denver, 120 Colo. 167, 207
P.2d 1194 (1949).
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handed down. Subject to the statutes of limitation, and to the avenues of
escape mentioned above, sentiment here would probably be that the mixed,
indivisible trust must fail. Furthermore, to take away from the successors of
the settlor their rights to a resulting trust previously vested would seem to
run afoul of our constitutional provisions. The English would have no wor-
ries on that score.
Proposed Redefinition of Charity.
The Nathan Report discussed a proposal that the legal definition of
"charity" be reworded and placed in a statute."9 Under the Charitable Trusts
Act of 1853 the list of charities found in the preamble to the Statute of
Charitable Uses of 1601 had been taken as a complete list of all permissible
charities, although it admittedly contains many objects which during the in-
tervening 350 years have become obsolete, such, for example, as providing
dowries to enable poor maids to get married and furnishing funds to redeem
captives. And, of course, economic and social changes have introduced many
new ways of accomplishing social benefit. The English courts have made
many decisions as to what is or is not charitable and some judges have at-
tempted definitions or classifications of charities, as, for example, Lord
Macnaghten's often quoted statement that charity includes education, relief
of poverty, religion, and other purposes beneficial to the community."
After some hesitation the Nathan Committee reported as follows:31
"We consider that a rewording of the 'definition' of charity is needed and
we favour a definition which would allow of flexibility in interpretation. We
recommend that the existing 'definition' of charity by reference to the Pre-
amble to the Statute of Charitable Uses should be repealed and that in its
stead there should be put on the Statute book a 'definition' based on Lord
Macnaghten's classification, but preserving the case law as it stands."
It is not believed that this suggestion will be attractive to American
legislators. While in this country there have been occasional judicial at-
tempts to give abstract definitions of charity,"2 they seem to have been of little
value, and have often been mere recitals Of some admitted types of charity"3
or statements as to the motives which the donor of a charitable gift must have.
The preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses, even if held to be a part of
American law, has universally been regarded not as containing an all inclu-
sive and final catalogue of charities, but as merely giving examples of com-
mon types in existence at the beginning of the 17th century in England. While
perhaps some argument could be made for the position that charitable trusts
must have as their object "the public good," "social welfare," or "community
"
2 Supra note 7 at 31.
"Commissioners v. Pemsel, [1891] A.C. 531, 580.
"Supra note 7 at 36.
2Mr. Justice Swayne in Ould v. Washington Hospital, 95 U.S. 303, 311 (1877).
"'Gray, J., in Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539, 556 (Mass. 1867).
1954]
benefit,"3 there has been no authoritative adoption of such a short descrip-
tive phrase. The courts and legislatures have been content to let the definition
of charity receive development through the hundreds of cases deciding that
this or that purpose is or is not charitable, and to allow new cases to be solved
by analogy or comparison. To adopt a short, all-inclusive definition would
require much construction to determine its meaning, and to decide whether
it was intended merely to codify the case law or to alter it in some way. It
would seem better to retain clearly the great mass of case law with its
elasticity. 5
Use of Charitable Trusts for Tax Evasion.
In the last few years the use of charitable trusts and foundations by
wealthy businessmen for the purpose of avoiding taxes has been exposed. A
Senate Sub-Committee under the chairmanship of the late Senator Tobey held
hearings during which spectacular testimony was presented. A brief filed by
the C.I.O. at the time of hearings regarding proposed legislation in Rhode
Island discussed the methods used by Mr. Royal Little and the Textron Trust
and similar instances."6 Law review articles have outlined the procedures
followed. 7 Not only were death taxes avoided by the making of gifts to
trusts and foundations which were within the control of the founder and his
family, but the payment of income taxes was also evaded by having the prop-
erty vested in an agency which was at least in form a charitable enterprise,
while the actual control of it was in the donor and his family and business
associates. In some cases extravagant salaries were paid to the founder or his
nominees. In other instances business property was sold to the charity and
leased back to the corporation in which the founder was interested. The
rentals were thus owned by charity and freed from taxation.
By an amendment of the Revenue Act in 1950 an attempt was made to
prevent these abuses.3" Tax privileges were denied to a charitable trust which
engaged in certain named "prohibited transactions," such as lending trust
funds without adequate security and interest, paying unreasonably high com-
pensation for personal services, making its charitable services available on
a preferential basis, buying property at more than an adequate consideration
or selling for less, or diverting trust property to the creator of the trust, his
family or a corporation controlled by him.
"The Restatement of Trusts, sec. 368, defines charitable purposes by giving five common classes
and adding that it includes "other purposes the accomplishment of which is beneficial to the com-
munity".
"For judicial views as to the impracticability of finding an abstract definition of "charity", see
Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. 465 (1860) ; People ex rel. Ellert v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129, 45 Pac. 270
(1896) ; Staines v. Burton, 17 Utah 331, 53 Pac. 1015 (1898).
6 Brief prepared by Solomon Barkin, Director of Research, Textile Workers Union of America.
"Eaton, Charitable Foundations, Tax Avoidance and Business Expediency, 35 VA. L. REV. 809,
987 (1949).3826 U.S.C.A. § 162 (g).
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